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NOTES AND COMMENT
PARENT AND CHILD--Loco PARENTIS-EMANcIPATIoN-Decedent

had custody of plaintiff from the age of 10 to 22, thus standing in
relation of loco parentis to him; plaintiff suing administrator alleges
that because of work he had performed for decedent and others,
the proceeds of which decedent had kept, decedent owd him $1,500,
and that she had always promised him said amount. Plaintiff sought
to recover same from the estate. Held: Relation of loco parentis gave
decedent the same rights as actual parent to wages of child, that those
rights continued after the child attained his majority, the law not
presuming any change in existing relations from the mere fact that
the child has attained his majority, and that without agreement regarding earnings after majority the right to plaintiff's earnings remained
with the decedent. Sparks vs. Hinckley (Utah, 1931) 5 Pac. 2nd Series 570.
The case follows the practically undisputed rules that one standing
'in loco parentis' to another (standing as parent to one not his child)
the rights and liabilities arising out of the relation are the same as
between parent and child, and therefore entitled to the earnings of
the child until its emancipation. The decision, however, is interesting
in that it upholds a doctrine seldom called into use recently, namely,
that the law will not presume any change in existing relation of parent
and child from the mere fact that the child has attained his majority.
The court cites Brown vs. Ramsey, 29 N.J.L. 117, as authority. That
case held that attaining the age of 21 years is not ipso facto emancipation of a child from his or her father, although at that age the
child may emancipate himself by separation from his father. The
doctrine had been previously enunciated in Overseers of the Poor of
Alexandria vs. Overseers of the Poor of Bethlehem, 16 N.J.L. 119.
Minnesota approached this viewpoint in Thysell vs. McDonald, et al.,
134 Minn. 400 (Ann. Cases, 1917C, 1015) in which the court said
that a child remaining in the family after becoming of age is not
entitled to pay for services rendered unless the services were performed pursuant to a prior agreement for compensation therefor. The
same doctrine was repeated in Lovell vs. Beedle, 138 Minn. 12 (163
N.W. 778). The instant case, however, is believed to be the first to
squarely accept the holding of Brown vs. Ramsey.
ED HERMSEN.

EVIDENCE: PAROL EVIDENCE: CONTRAcT-Wheelwright v. Pure
Milk Association,__Wis.__240, N.W. 769. This is a case relating principally to the interpretation of a contract, and to the propriety of resorting to parol evidence for this purpose.

